[Breaking Hyo] Debate begins on the mandatory tender-offer proposal I call a terrible law: the last chance to resolve KOSPI undervaluation
An independent exercise, not a statement by the video creator or verification of every claim in the video.
Allocation depends on who actually tenders
Assume 100 hypothetical shares: the controller owns 40 and other shareholders own 60, everyone tenders, and the buyer purchases only 50. Controller-first purchasing produces sales of 40 and 10; pro rata allocation across all tenders produces 20 and 30. But if other shareholders tender only 10, total tenders are 50, so allocation across all tenders also produces sales of 40 and 10. Check actual tenders and the eligible pool, not just ownership percentages.
Check for yourself
- Are prior purchases deducted from the purchase limit, or are all tenders allocated together?
- What assumes participation by all other shareholders, and what happens when tenders fall short?
Limits of application
This hypothetical allocation example omits the additional 1 share in 50%+1 share, fractional-share treatment, related parties and exemptions. It is not an interpretation of current law or a forecast of deal completion or share prices.
- What to look for
- See why the same offer price can produce different exit opportunities depending on whose shares are bought first.
- Why it matters
- Calculate sale quantities by separating purchase size, tendered shares and the allocation pool, while distinguishing a policy proposal from an enacted rule.
Timeline
3 segmentsUsing a controller with 40% and other shareholders with 60%, the speaker compares controller-first purchasing with pro rata allocation across all shareholders. Under a simplified total purchase of 50%, he favors sales of 20% by the controller and 30% by other shareholders; this should be distinguished from the debated 50%+1 share.