Has Iran really been pushed to its limits? The real reason it has stopped attacking for now | Sung Il-kwang and Park Hyun-do, professors at Sogang University's Euro-MENA Institute [Conversation with Gods]
- What to look for
- A discussion with Middle East experts examines why the U.S.–Iran war is becoming prolonged, issues surrounding Hormuz, oil prices, and gas, the 7-day proposal, and scenarios involving sanctions and escalation.
- Why it matters
- This helps you learn a framework for interpreting the channels through which war-related news affects oil prices and market uncertainty.
AI summary
Two professors at Sogang University's Euro-MENA Institute compare the Middle East war to the 7th inning, or the bottom of the 5th and top of the 6th innings, of a baseball game, and see a greater likelihood of escalation after the midterm elections. They say U.S. air power alone cannot easily eliminate all Iranian missile and drone capabilities dispersed underground and across various locations, and that the approach to sanctions against Iran would not change even if Democrats took control of Congress. They point out that deploying ground troops is unlikely to be practical because of the limitations of proxy forces, the need for at least 50 ten-thousand troops, mountainous terrain, and the burden of public opinion. They believe Iran is trying to keep oil prices within the 90~120 range until the elections, and that shipping volumes through Hormuz are recovering because Iran is exercising restraint amid expectations of negotiations and requests from China. They see a strong possibility of renewed attacks within 1~2 weeks. They explain that agreement on denuclearization is difficult because Iran insists on its right to enrich uranium, and that there is concern it could cross the nuclear threshold after its nuclear-threshold strategy fails. They say withdrawal from the NPT would mean following North Korea's path, which China and Russia also oppose. Despite disagreement over the sequencing of Hamas's disarmament and Gaza's reconstruction, and an extremely close Israeli general election, they expect the approach to the war is likely to continue regardless of a change in government. They worry about worst-case scenarios such as reciprocal attacks on energy facilities and escalation into the Indian Ocean, saying Hormuz cannot return to its prewar state and that exits such as the 7-day proposal are blocked by the issue of guarantees. All these outlooks are the speakers' conditional assessments, not definitive predictions of short-term prices.